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1. Introduction
Almost ten years after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the
demarcation between the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and
the external policy areas defined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU
still gives rise to inter-institutional conflicts before the European Court of
Justice.1 These conflicts essentially concern the choice of the appropriate legal
basis for EU external action. As is well known, this choice has “constitutional
significance” in the EU legal order in the sense that it determines the EU’s
competence to act and the decision-making procedures which have to be
followed.2 This explains why the Council’s addition of a CFSP legal basis
(Art. 31(1) TEU) requiring unanimity for the adoption of a decision
determining the EU’s position within the Cooperation Council established
under the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (EPCA) with
Kazakhstan was challenged by the Commission before the ECJ, leading to the
present judgment. In the Commission’s view, the decision should have been
adopted on the basis of qualified majority voting (QMV) with Article 218(9)
TFEU as the sole procedural legal basis.
What appears to be at first sight a rather classic inter-institutional turf battle
regarding a largely technical issue, is actually part of a more broader
constitutional debate concerning the post-Lisbon legal framework for EU
external action.3 In particular, the determination of the CFSP as a special yet
1. Van Elsuwege, “The potential for inter-institutional conflicts before the Court of Justice:
Impact of the Lisbon Treaty” in Cremona and Thies (Eds.), The European Court of Justice and
External Relations: Constitutional Challenges (Hart, 2014), pp. 115–136.
2. Opinion 2/00, Cartagena Protocol, EU:C:2001:664, para 5.
3. See e.g. Van Elsuwege, “EU external action after the collapse of the pillar structure: In
search of a new balance between delimitation and consistency”, 47 CML Rev. (2010), 987
–1019; Govaere, “Multi-faceted single legal personality and a hidden horizontal pillar: EU
external relations post-Lisbon”, (2011) Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies,
87–111; Wouters and Ramopoulos, “Revisiting the Lisbon Treaty’s constitutional design of EU
Common Market Law Review 56: 1333–1354, 2019.
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fully integrated part of the EU legal order has given rise to a series of
judgments, notably dealing with the limitations to the jurisdiction of the ECJ,4
the legal basis for the adoption of restrictive measures,5 and the role of the
European Parliament in the conclusion of international agreements.6 The
dispute surrounding the legal basis for the adoption of a Council Decision
determining the EU’s position within the Cooperation Council of the EPCA
with Kazakhstan adds a new element to this discussion. For the first time, the
ECJ was asked to clarify the delimitation between CFSP and non-CFSP
competences with respect to the implementation of an international
agreement, more precisely in relation to the adoption of EU positions on the
basis of Article 218(9) TFEU.7 This has a particular relevance for the
determination of the applicable voting rights in the Council.
Remarkably, the action for annulment did not concern the legal basis for
signature and provisional application of the EPCA itself, but only the Council
Decision on the EU’s position for the adoption of working arrangements in
the joint bodies established on the basis of this agreement. Nevertheless, this
action may be regarded as a response to an evolving practice in the EU’s
treaty-making procedure whereby the Council increasingly includes a CFSP
legal basis in broad framework agreements with third countries that involve
CFSP references.8 Hence, the implications of the inter-institutional dispute
between the Commission and the Council go far beyond the adoption of the
rules of procedure in this particular Cooperation Council. They essentially
concern the position of the CFSP in the EU legal order and the institutional
balance in the framework of Article 218 TFEU.
external relations” in Rossi and Casolari (Eds.), The EU after Lisbon:Amending or Coping with
the Existing Treaties? (Springer, 2014), pp. 215–237.
4. Case C-439/13, Elitaliana SpA v. Eulex Kosovo, EU:C:2015:753; Case C-455/14 H v.
Council, EU:C:2016:569; Case C-72/15, PJSC Rosneft Oil Company v. Her Majesty’s
Treasury and Others, EU:C:2017:236.
5. Case C-130/10, Parliament v. Council, EU:C:2012:472.
6. Case C-658/11, Parliament v. Council (Mauritius), EU:C:2014:2025; Case C-263/14,
Parliament v. Council (Tanzania), EU:C:2016:435.
7. The ECJ already ruled on the interpretation of Art. 218(9)TFEU is a series of other cases,
but these cases did not concern the delimitation between CFSP and non-CFSP competences.
See e.g. Case C-431/11 United Kingdom v. Council (EEA), EU:C:2013:589; Case C-656/11,
United Kingdom v. Council (Switzerland), EU:C:2014:97; Case C-81/13, United Kingdom v.
Council (Turkey), EU:C:2014:2449.
8. Naert, “The use of a CFSP legal basis for EU international agreements in combination
with other legal bases”, in Czuczai and Naert (Eds.), The EU as a GlobalActor. Bridging Legal
Theory and Practice. Liber Amicorum in Honour of Ricardo Gosalbo Bono (Brill, 2016),
pp. 394–423.
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2. Factual and legal background
The EPCA between the EU and its Member States of the one part and the
Republic of Kazakhstan of the other part was signed in Astana on 21
December 2015 and provisionally entered into force on 1 May 2016. The
Council Decision on the signature and provisional application of this
agreement was adopted on the legal basis of Articles 37 and 31(1) TEU and
Articles 91, 100(2) and 207 and 209 TFEU in conjunction with Article 218(5)
and the second subparagraph of Article 218(8) TFEU.9 Like most framework
agreements, the EPCA provides for the establishment of joint institutions,
including a Cooperation Council, Cooperation Committee and specialized
subcommittees. In order to ensure the effective implementation of the
Agreement, the rules of procedure of these institutional bodies are to be
adopted as soon as possible.10 For this purpose, the High Representative and
the European Commission jointly proposed a Council Decision on the
position to be adopted on behalf of the EU with regard to this issue.
Significantly, the proposal referred to Articles 37 TEU and Articles 207 and
209 TFEU as the substantive legal bases for this decision, with Article 218(9)
TFEU as the sole procedural legal basis. The Council, however, modified the
proposal and used exactly the same legal bases as were used for the decision
on the signature and provisional application of the agreement. This implied,
inter alia, the addition of Article 31(1) TEU involving the requirement of
unanimity for the adoption of the decision. The Commission fundamentally
disagreed and argued that the decision should be adopted on the basis of
qualified majority voting.
In the Commission’s view, the voting rules for the adoption of any Council
decision under Article 218(9) TFEU are to be found in the first subparagraph
of Article 218(8) TFEU, which states that “the Council shall act by qualified
majority voting throughout the procedure”. It referred to a judgment from
2014 where the ECJ had found that a position to be established in the context
of the EEC-Turkey Association Agreement – regarding the extension of
social security legislation to Turkey – was to be adopted by qualified majority
voting “in accordance with the combined measures of the first paragraph of
Article 218(8) TFEU and Article 218(9) TFEU”.11 Accordingly, the voting
requirement for the adoption of the EU’s position within the Association
Council deviated from the requirements for the conclusion of association
9. Council Decision (EU) 2016/123 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, and
provisional application of the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the
European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of Kazakhstan, of the
other part, O.J. 2016, L 29/1.
10. See Art. 268 EPCA.
11. Case C-81/13, United Kingdom v. Council (Turkey), para 66.
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agreements, which imply a unanimous decision of the Council and the consent
of the European Parliament.12 The Commission derived from the Court’s case
law that Article 218(9) TFEU must be regarded as a lex specialis in the sense
that it lays down a simplified procedure to be followed by the Council as long
as the decision does not supplement or amend the institutional framework of
the agreement.13 Moreover, it claimed that the Council’s addition of Article
31(1) TEU violated Article 40(1) TEU in the sense that it resulted in the
application of CFSP procedures in relation to non-CFSP policies.14
The Council, on the other hand, stressed the link between the substantive
and institutional provisions of the Agreement, claiming that the decision on
the adoption of the EU’s position in the Cooperation Council should follow
the legal basis for the decision authorizing the signature and provisional
application of the EPCA.15 In addition, the Council argued that the specific
features of the CFSP must also be taken into account in the application of
Article 218(9) TFEU in order to avoid a violation of the second paragraph of
Article 40 TEU.16 Whereas Article 218(9) TFEU provides for a separate and
simplified procedure for the adoption of EU positions in bodies set up by an
agreement, this does not, in the Council’s view, affect the voting rules in the
Council, but only concerns the limited participation of the European
Parliament.
Hence, the dispute reveals the existence of divergent views between the
Commission and the Council regarding the procedural aspects for the
implementation of so-called framework agreements with third countries. Such
agreements typically include a wide range of policy areas, including CFSP
and non-CFSP aspects, and are not unsurprisingly the legal battleground for
inter-institutional conflicts. The rather technical and politically not very
sensitive question concerning the choice of legal basis for the adoption of the
EU’s position as regards the workings arrangements in the joint institutions
with Kazakhstan provided an opportunity to bring this issue before the ECJ.17
As will be argued further, the significance of this judgment goes far beyond
the actual subject matter of the case in the sense that it affects the EU’s
treaty-making practice after Lisbon as well as the position of the CFSP in the
EU legal order.
12. See Art. 218(6)(a)(i) and Art. 218(8) TFEU.
13. Judgment, para 12.
14. Ibid., para 13.
15. Ibid., paras. 14–15.
16. Ibid., para 16.
17. As also observed by Kuijper, it is noteworthy that not a single Member State nor the
European Parliament intervened in this procedure. See Kuijper, “Case C-244/17 – Commission
v. Council: The centre of gravity test revisited in the context ofArticle 218(9) TFEU”,European
Law Blog, Nov. 26, 2018, at: <europeanlawblog.eu>.
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3. Opinion ofAdvocate General Kokott
Advocate General Kokott quickly ruled out the Commission’s view that all
Council decisions establishing the EU’s position under the terms of Article
218(9) TFEU have to be adopted by qualified majority voting. A detailed
contextual interpretation of Article 218(8) TFEU, which refers to qualified
majority voting as the general rule in the procedure, reveals that this reference
concerns the different stages for the conclusion of an international agreement
as defined in the preceding paragraphs of this provision. Article 218(9) TFEU,
on the other hand, concerns the implementation of the agreement and provides
“a separate, simplified procedure that is subject to its own rules and differs
from the conventional procedure for concluding international agreements”.18
Since Article 218(9) TFEU does not include a specific reference to the
majority requirements in the Council, the general provisions on the adoption
of decisions in the Council are applicable. Depending on the subject area,
these provisions are found either in Article 16(3) TFEU, which defines
qualified majority voting as the main rule except where the Treaties provide
otherwise, or in Article 31(1) TEU, which provides that decisions with respect
to the CFSP are in general to be adopted unanimously.
In order to decide on this matter, the Advocate General proposed a
traditional centre of gravity test based upon an analysis of the EPCA in its
entirety.19 The EPCA is a comprehensive framework agreement covering
provisions relating to political dialogue and cooperation in the area of foreign
and security policy, trade and business, and a wide variety of areas of sectoral
cooperation. This implies that “in principle a very broad spectrum of legal
bases in substantive law can be taken into consideration”.20 However, the
Advocate General underlined that a cumulation of legal bases is to be regarded
as an absolute exception which has only rarely been accepted in the case law
of the ECJ.21 Accordingly, she proceeded with an analysis of the aims, content
and context of the partnership with Kazakhstan in order to determine the
centre of gravity.
After observing that the aims and content of the EPCA contain a number of
subjects related to the CFSP, the Advocate General concluded that they “are
far from being the centre of gravity of that Agreement”.22 In order to come to
this conclusion, she observed that the overwhelming majority of the
provisions relate to trade and business whereas other parts can be connected to
18. Opinion, para 43.
19. Ibid., para 51.
20. Ibid., para 57.
21. Ibid., para 63.
22. Ibid., para 69.
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development cooperation and cooperation in the area of freedom, security and
justice.23 Significantly, she also pointed out that a waiver of the CFSP legal
basis does not lead to a weakening of the foreign and security component of
the Agreement since the cross-cutting clause of Article 21(1) TEU ensures
that the latter can also be implemented on the basis of non-CFSP instruments.
In this sense, a particular reference is made to the broad scope of the EU’s
competences in the area of development cooperation involving a link with
clauses on political dialogue and respect for human rights.24 As a result, the
Advocate General concluded that the Council incorrectly added Article 31(1)
TEU and its concomitant requirement of unanimity.
4. Judgment of the Court of Justice
After recalling its case law regarding Article 218 TFEU, which holds that this
provision lays down a single procedure of general application concerning the
negotiation and conclusion of international agreements which the EU is
competent to conclude in the fields of its activity, including CFSP,25 the ECJ
observed that Article 218(9) TFEU lays down a simplified procedure for the
adoption of positions on behalf of the EU in the context of decision-making
bodies set up by an international agreement. In line with the Opinion of
Advocate General Kokott – and contrary to the view of the Commission – the
Court pointed out that this simplification consists exclusively of a limitation
of the Parliament’s participation. It does not affect the voting rule in the
Council, which must be determined in each individual case.26 The question
whether the Council decides by unanimity or on the basis of qualified majority
voting depends upon the substantive legal basis of the decision, which is
subject to a centre of gravity test. Accordingly, the symmetry between
procedures relating to the internal activity of the EU and procedures relating to
its external activity is guaranteed.27 In other words, the Council has to decide
unanimously under Article 218(9) TFEU in those cases where the subject
matter of the decision involves an area where unanimity is required for the
adoption of an EU act, which is the case with respect to the CFSP. This rule
reflects the principle of institutional balance, as already defined in the Court’s
23. Ibid., para 76.
24. Ibid., paras. 77–78.
25. To that effect, see Case C-658/11, Parliament v. Council, para 51.
26. Judgment, paras. 25–27.
27. Ibid., para 29.
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previous case law regarding the negotiation and conclusion of international
agreements.28
It is noteworthy that the Court explicitly clarified that the reference to the
first subparagraph of Article 218(8) in conjunction with Article 218(9) TFEU
in the UK v. Council case concerning the implementation of the association
agreement with Turkey, does not imply that each and any decision establishing
a position to be adopted on behalf of the EU in a body set up by an agreement
requires qualified majority voting. In that particular case, the subject matter
concerned the coordination of social security legislation as covered in Article
48 TFEU, which could not be equated to a decision concerning the conclusion
of an agreement amending the association agreement. The latter situation
would require unanimity in the Council, in line with the second subparagraph
of Article 218(9) TFEU. Significantly, the Court explicitly distinguished the
situation regarding association agreements and their implementation – which
form “a specific category” of international agreements – from “Council
decisions covering a field for which unanimity is required for the adoption of
a Union act”.29 In the latter case, the requirement of unanimity “relates to the
field which the act adopted covers, and therefore to the act’s content”.30
Without explicitly referring to the area of CFSP, the Court thus suggested that
Council decisions establishing an EU position in a body set up by an
international agreement are to be adopted on the basis of unanimity if the
position relates to an area covering the CFSP (or another area requiring
unanimity for the adoption of a Union act). Whether or not this is the case,
depends upon the substantive legal basis of the decision, which is determined
on the basis of a traditional centre of gravity test.
With respect to the application of the centre of gravity test to the case at
stake, the ECJ largely followed the reasoning of Advocate General Kokott. In
particular, the Court also proceeded from an analysis of the aims and content
of the EPCA as a whole in order to find that the links with the CFSP are
insufficient to justify the addition of a CFSP legal basis. The Court used both
quantitative (i.e. the relatively limited number of CFSP related provisions in
the agreement) and qualitative (i.e. the largely declaratory nature of the
provisions) criteria to come to the conclusion that the CFSP provisions cannot
be regarded as a distinct component of the Agreement and are incidental to
the areas of common commercial policy and development cooperation.31
28. Case C-658/11, Parliament v.Council. See for comments: Van Elsuwege, “Securing the
institutional balance in the procedure for concluding international agreements: European
Parliament v. Council (Pirate Transfer Agreement with Mauritius)”, 52 CML Rev. (2015),
1379–1434.
29. Judgment, paras. 33–34.
30. Ibid., para 34.
31. Ibid., paras. 43–46.
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Consequently, the Court found that the contested decision must be annulled.
Taking into account the negative consequences for the implementation of the
EPCA, the effects of this decision should be maintained on grounds of legal
certainty.
5. Comments
Formally speaking, the Court’s judgment only concerned the choice of the
correct legal basis for the adoption of the EU’s position within the
Cooperation Council established under the EPCA with Kazakhstan. However,
this case should be considered in the context of a wider controversy regarding
the position of the CFSP in the EU legal order. It confirms the Court’s
“integrationist approach” known from previous judgments concerning the
scope of judicial review in relation to the CFSP.32 Also in those cases, the
Court proceeded on the basis of the unity of the EU legal order and refused to
regard the CFSP as a separate framework for cooperation. The same logic
applies with respect to the procedure for the conclusion and implementation of
international agreements on behalf of the EU. Hence, the ECJ is fairly
consistent in approaching the post-Lisbon architecture for the EU’s external
action. This, however, does not mean that this approach is without criticism. It
may well be argued that the Court minimizes or even ignores the intention of
the drafters of the Treaties to retain a special status for the CFSP in
comparison to the EU’s other policy areas. Moreover, the judgment has
significant implications for the EU’s treaty-making practice.
5.1. The centre of gravity test as a tool to overcome the duality of EU
external action
The division between CFSP and non-CFSP external action is one of the key
constitutional challenges of the EU’s post-Lisbon legal order. On the one
hand, the CFSP is fully integrated in the EU’s single legal framework and
subject to the same principles and objectives as the other EU policy areas.33
On the other hand, it remains subject to specific rules and procedures,
including the absence of legislative acts, the use of unanimity as a general rule
in the Council, a right of initiative for the High Representative and the
32. On this point, see Koutrakos, “Judicial review in the EU’s Common Foreign and
Security Policy”, 67 ICLQ (2017), 1–35 and Case C-455/14, H v.Council, EU:C:2016:569 and
Case C-72/15, PJSC Rosneft Oil Company v. Her Majesty’s Treasury and Others, EU:C:
2017:236.
33. Art. 23 TEU.
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Member States, no participation in the decision-making process for the
European Parliament, and a limited jurisdiction for the ECJ.34 The CFSP
particularity is visible in the sense that it is the only policy area defined in the
TEU instead of the TFEU. Moreover, Article 40 TEU explicitly provides that
the implementation of the CFSP may not affect the EU’s non-CFSP external
action and vice versa. It has been argued that this provision reflects “the
continuing bipolarity of EU external action” requiring a pragmatic approach
to decide on the correct legal basis depending upon the nature and the context
of the action.35
It is noteworthy that both the European Commission and the Council
explicitly referred to Article 40 TEU in order to defend their respective
positions in the case (see above, section 2). Strikingly enough, the ECJ
completely ignored this provision in its deliberation. Rather, it stressed the
significance of “the institutional balance established by the framers of the
Treaties” as the key guiding principle to deal with the inter-institutional
conflict at stake.36 In other words, the Court does not proceed from a
fundamental division between CFSP and non-CFSP competences, but applies
the general constitutional principle of institutional balance horizontally.37
This is essentially derived from the unified nature of the procedure for
negotiation and conclusion of international agreements, as laid down in
Article 218 TFEU.38 The logical consequence is that the decision regarding
the correct legal basis for the adoption of the contested decision is based on a
centre of gravity test. This is a well-known mechanism to solve disputes
regarding the horizontal division of competence in the EU legal order.39
However, the application of a centre of gravity test in relation to the EU’s
external action is not uncontroversial, especially when it concerns the choice
of legal basis for the conclusion of international agreements – such as the
EPCA – which cover a wide range of policy areas. In such a context, the
outcome of the test is always somewhat unpredictable and subject to
34. Art. 24(1) TEU.
35. Dashwood, “The continuing bipolarity of EU external action”, in Govaere, et al. (Eds.),
The European Union in the World. Essays in Honour of Professor Marc Maresceau (Martinus
Nijhoff, 2014), pp. 3–16.
36. Judgment, para 30.
37. On this point, see also Bosse-Platière, “A propos de la mise en oeuvre de l’APC avec le
Kazakhstan, la Cour confirme la banalisation du contentieux de la base juridique PESC”,
RTDE (2019).
38. Judgment, para 24.
39. It is noteworthy that A.G. Kokott explicitly provides that the centre of gravity approach
should always be restricted to the horizontal division of powers in order not to interfere with the
principle of conferral (see Opinion, para 59), an argument that she also made in her Opinion in
the Antarctica cases, which was delivered on the same day (see Opinion of A.G. Kokott in
Joined Cases C-626/15 & C-659/16, European Commission v. Council, EU:C:2018:925).
Case C-244/17 1341
discussion. For instance, it is very difficult to draw a precise borderline
between provisions that constitute a distinct component of the agreement, and
therefore warrant a specific legal basis in the Council decision, and provisions
that are only ancillary in nature.40 Arguably, the Treaty of Lisbon only
complicated this exercise due to the introduction of a single set of external
action objectives, listed in Article 21 TEU, and the absence of specific
objectives for the CFSP. Moreover, as a result of Article 40 TEU, the old
delimitation rule that priority should be given to the non-CFSP legal basis
whenever possible no longer applies.41
Nevertheless, the new constitutional framework did not prevent the ECJ
from continuing its settled case law regarding the choice of legal basis, be it
with certain nuances. Whereas the centre of gravity test is still formally based
on an analysis of the “aims and content” of the contested decision, the
“context” of the measure is also increasingly taken into account.42 It is
noteworthy that Advocate General Kokott explicitly referred to the “context”
as a third element next to aim and content, but added that “the subjective
assessment and the general political intentions of the parties involved have no
significance for the choice of legal basis”.43 In solving the dispute regarding
the correct legal basis for the conclusion of an agreement on the transfer of
pirates with Tanzania, the Court relied heavily on the context of Operation
Atalanta to confirm the CFSP legal basis of the contested decision.44 Also in
its recent judgment in the Antarctica cases, the ECJ analysed in detail the
broader context of the contested decisions, which were adopted in the context
of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
40. See e.g. Klammert, “Conflicts of legal basis: No legality and no basis but a bright future
under the Lisbon Treaty?”, 35 EL Rev. (2010), 497; Cremona, “Balancing Union and Member
State interests: Opinion 1/08, choice of legal base and the Common Commercial Policy after the
Treaty of Lisbon”; 35 EL Rev. (2010), 690; Adam, “The legal basis of international agreements
of the European Union in the post-Lisbon area”, in Govaere, et al. (Eds.), The European Union
in the World. Essays in Honour of Professor Marc Maresceau (Martinus Nijhoff, 2013),
pp. 65–86; De Baere, Van den Sanden, “Interinstitutional gravity and Pirates of the Parliament
on Stranger Tides: The continued constitutional significance of the choice of legal basis in
post-Lisbon external action”, 12 EuConst (2016), 85–113.
41. Ex Art. 47 TEU as interpreted in Case C-91/05, Commission v. Council, EU:C:
2008:288, paras. 58 –62. For comments, see e.g.Van Elsuwege, “On the boundaries between the
European Union’s first pillar and second pillar: A comment on the ECOWAS judgment of the
European Court of Justice”, 15 CJEL (2009), 531–548.
42. On this point, see the Court’s case law mentioned in note 7 supra.
43. Opinion, para 53. The A.G. also mentions that the context of the EPCA was discussed
during the hearings of the case, together with its proceedings, aims and content (para 61).
44. See Case C-658/11, Parliament v. Council. For comments, see Sánchez-Tabernero,
“The choice of legal basis and the principle of consistency in the procedure for conclusion of
international agreements in CFSP contexts: Parliament v. Council (Pirate-Transfer Agreement
with Tanzania)”, 54 CML Rev. (2017), 899–920.
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Resources, in order to determine their legal bases (e.g. discussing the
Canberra Convention).45
This contextual approach was not explicitly followed by the Court in the
Kazakhstan case, apart from the observation that the EPCA as a whole
provides the context for deciding on the correct legal basis of the contested
Council decision. Taking into account that the EPCA is a comprehensive
framework agreement, this context cannot as such be linked to a particular
CFSP or non-CFSP legal basis. As a result, and given the difficulties
identified above in applying an objectives-based approach, the Court relied
heavily on the content of the agreement, focusing on the large number of
provisions falling within the areas of common commercial policy and
development cooperation in comparison to the CFSP, on the one hand, and the
less detailed commitments under the latter policy area, on the other. In this
respect, the Court noted that the CFSP provisions in the EPCA are “limited to
declarations of the contracting parties on the aims that their cooperation must
pursue . . . and do not determine in concrete terms the manner in which the
cooperation will be implemented”.46 Hence, the Court’s judgment combined
both quantitative and qualitative criteria in an attempt to operationalize the
rather abstract centre of gravity test.47
Whereas this operationalization may be regarded as a significant evolution
in the Court’s case law regarding legal basis litigation, some critical remarks
could be made. First of all, the question arises whether these criteria
appropriately reflect the interests and intentions of the parties.48 Counting the
number of provisions related to a particular policy area and assessing the
nature of the commitments may underestimate the significance of certain
parts of an agreement.49 For instance, Advocate General Kokott pointed out
that the CFSP-related provisions of the EPCA can be found “at an extremely
important location in the Partnership Agreement” without, however, drawing
any conclusions regarding the implications of this finding for the choice of
45. Joined Cases C-626/15 & C-659/16, European Commission v. Council, EU:C:
2018:925, paras. 76–100.
46. Judgment, para 45.
47. However, in its more recent judgment in the Antarctica cases, the ECJ mainly analysed
the broader context and objectives of the subject of the contested decisions, which were adopted
in the context of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources,
in order to determine their legal bases. Hence, as far as the analysis of the content of the
agreement is concerned, the ECJ did not apply a detailed quantitative analysis as in the
Kazakhstan EPCA case (in Joined Cases C-626/15 & C-659/16,Commission v. Council, paras.
76–100).
48. Cremona, op. cit. supra note 40.
49. A.G. Kokott’s quantitative analysis was more detailed than the one applied by the Court.
For example, she counted literally the total number of provisions in the EPCA to identify the
proportion of provisions dedicated to specific TFEU areas such as the CCP (Opinion, para 71).
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legal basis.50 Second, the focus on quantitative and qualitative criteria seems
to overlook the rather special nature of the CFSP competence. The latter does
not have specific policy objectives and is, almost by definition, bound to be
less detailed and less far-reaching in comparison to other areas. 51 Third, the
treatment of the CFSP on par with every other EU policy area sits somewhat
uncomfortably with the intention of the drafters of the Treaty to retain a
special status for the CFSP under Article 40 TEU. The Court’s striking silence
on the substantive interpretation of this provision implies that Article 40 TEU
is considered to be a largely redundant repetition of the general constitutional
principle of institutional balance. However, the question arises whether this
view is compatible with the objectives of this provision. It may, for instance,
be argued that Article 40 TEU, and in particular the addition of a second
paragraph in comparison to ex Article 47 TEU, has a more fundamental
function, which is to safeguard the specific features of the CFSP in the EU
legal order.52 From this perspective, the question arises whether a traditional
centre of gravity test is appropriate to distinguish between CFSP and
non-CFSP competences.
Whereas the Court’s judgment does not solve the inherent ambiguity
surrounding the application of a centre of gravity test in practice, it
nevertheless clarifies the logic behind the choice of legal basis in relation to
Article 218 TFEU. The latter lays down a single procedure of general
application for the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements
covering the entire scope of EU competences, including the CFSP. It follows
that the choice of legal basis for decisions adopted within the framework of
Article 218 TFEU has to respond to the same criteria as those applicable for
the adoption of all EU acts, in compliance with the principle of institutional
balance. Proceeding from the unity of the EU legal order, the Court thus
confirms the symmetry between the rules for the adoption of EU measures
internally and those applying in the context of its external action.53 This
implies that decisions must preferably be adopted on a single legal basis
reflecting the predominant subject matter, with the latter determining the
procedural rules to be followed.TheKazakhstan case clarified that entirely the
same logic applies with respect to the adoption of EU positions in bodies set
up by an international agreement as foreseen under Article 218(9) TFEU.54
50. Opinion, para 68.
51. Engel, The Choice of Legal Basis for Acts of the European Union. Competence
Overlaps, Institutional Preferences and Legal Basis Litigation (Springer, 2018), p. 45.
52. Adam, op. cit. supra note 41.
53. Judgment, para 22. The Court made this explicit for the first time in Case C-658/11,
Parliament v. Council.
54. The only exception is that the European Parliament is not involved in the simplified
decision-making procedure under Art. 218 (9) TFEU. See Judgment, para 26.
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Hence, the correct legal basis depends upon the predominant subject matter of
the particular position. When the scope of the position is as broad as the scope
of the agreement itself, as was the case with respect to the adoption of the rules
of procedure for the bodies set up under the EPCA, the position is to be
adopted on the same legal basis as the agreement itself.
Finally, in applying a general centre of gravity test to decide on the
applicable voting rules for the adoption of a Council decision under Article
218(9) TFEU, the Court also puts its previous case law in perspective. In Case
C-81/13, which concerned the implementation of the EU-Turkey Association
Agreement (see above), the main criterion was whether or not a Council
decision could be equated to a decision concerning the conclusion of an
agreement amending the association agreement.55 This criterion is irrelevant
for non-association agreements such as the EPCA; but, of course, also in this
case the substantive legal basis of a Council decision determines the
procedural requirements. Accordingly, the key element is whether or not the
outcome of a centre of gravity test results in the use of a legal basis
determining the use of unanimity.
5.2. Implications for the EU’s treaty-making practice
The Council’s approach with respect to the adoption of EU positions under
Article 218(9) TFEU has not always been consistent in the context of
framework agreements with a CFSP dimension. For example, whereas in the
case of the EPCA with Kazakhstan the Council added a reference to Article
31(1) TEU to its decision on the EU’s position for the adoption of working
arrangements in the joint bodies established on the basis of the Agreement, it
did not insist on an additional CFSP legal basis for similar decisions adopted
in the context of other framework agreements with CFSP provisions.56
55. Judgment, para 33.
56. See e.g. Council Decision (EU) 2018/1714 on the position to be taken on behalf of the
European Union within the Joint Committee established by the Framework Agreement between
the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Australia, of the other part, as
regards the adoption of the rules of procedure of the Joint Committee and the adoption of the
terms of reference of its sub-committees and working groups (O.J. 2018, L 286/22); Council
and Commission Decision (EU, Euratom) 2015/55 on the position to be taken on behalf of the
European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community within the Association Council
established by the Association Agreement between the European Union and the European
Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of
Moldova, of the other part, as regards the adoption of decisions of the Association Council on
the Rules of Procedure of the Association Council and those of the Association Committee and
of Sub-Committees, the establishment of two Sub-Committees and the delegation of certain
powers by the Association Council to the Association Committee in Trade configuration, O.J.
2015, L 9/46.
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However, in the light of the ECJ’s judgment in theKazakhstan case, from now
on decisions on implementation of international agreements can only have a
CFSP legal basis (and therefore trigger unanimity in the Council’s
decision-making procedure under Art. 218(9) TFEU) if their centre of gravity
falls within the CFSP. In practice, this is unlikely to happen, as such joint
bodies are rarely mandated to implement CFSP-related elements of the
agreements.
Significantly, the Court’s judgment in theKazakhstan case also has broader
implications. In particular, it affects a practice developed in recent years to
combine the use of a CFSP legal basis with TFEU legal bases for the adoption
of Council decisions on the signature and provisional application, and
sometimes also the conclusion, of international agreements.57 Whereas this
combination was ruled out for the adoption of unilateral measures in the Smart
sanctions case,58 no procedural incompatibilities exist as far as international
agreements are concerned.59 This is a direct consequence of the single
procedural code of Article 218 TFEU and its direct link with the substantive
legal basis of the Council decision for concluding the agreement. In other
words, when an agreement equally concerns CFSP and TFEU competences,
the interpretation of Articles 218(6) and (8) TFEU implies that the consent of
the European Parliament can be perfectly combined with a unanimous
decision in the Council. Such a particular form of CFSP-TFEU mixity has
been applied in practice, for instance, with regard to the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation in Southeast Asia,60 the Agreement continuing the International
Science and Technology Centre61 and the Agreement establishing the
EU-LAC International Foundation.62 Nevertheless, the centre of gravity test
implies that such a combination of legal bases is of an exceptional nature and
only possible when a measure “simultaneously pursues a number of
objectives, or has several components, which are inextricably linked without
one being incidental to the other”.63
It is noteworthy that the combination of CFSP and TFEU legal bases has
been increasingly used in relation to framework agreements such as
association agreements and different types of partnership and cooperation
57. See on this evolution Naert, op. cit. supra note 8.
58. Case C-130/10, Parliament v. Council, para 46.
59. Adam, op. cit. supra note 40, p. 82.
60. Council Decision 2012/308/CFSP on the accession of the European Union to the Treaty
of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, O.J. 2012, L 154.
61. Council Decision (EU) 2015/1989, O.J. 2015, L 290/7.
62. Council Decision (EU) 2016/1873, O.J. 2016, L 288/1.
63. See e.g. Case C-263/14, Parliament v. Council, para 46; Judgment, para 37.
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agreements. Such agreements almost always include references to the CFSP
in dedicated titles on “Political Dialogue and Cooperation” and/or “Foreign
and Security Policy”, or even in the preamble. It is true that the importance of
these CFSP references varies in qualitative and quantitative terms between
these different agreements. However, if one were to apply the ECJ’s approach
in the Kazakhstan case, discussed above, the conclusion would arguably be
that these CFSP references are not the centre of gravity of these agreements.
Moreover, these CFSP components are not “inseparably linked” with the
other, non-CFSP parts of the agreement and are essentially incidental to the
latter, thus precluding the addition of a CFSP legal basis next to other TFEU
legal bases.64 This is precisely the conclusion which has been drawn by the
European Commission with respect to its proposal for a Council decision on
the position to be adopted on behalf of the EU in the Partnership Council
established by the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement
(CEPA) with Armenia. Initially, the High Representative and the Commission
had adopted a joint proposal based on Article 37 TEU and Articles 91, 100(2),
207 and 209 TFEU in conjunction with Article 218(9) TFEU. Based on the
ECJ’s judgment in the Kazakhstan case, the Commission decided to drop
Article 37 TEU as a legal basis in the amended proposal. In the Commission’s
view, the limited number of CFSP provisions in the CEPA do not require a
separate legal basis taking into account that they are only incidental to the
predominant components of the Agreement.65 This reasoning would equally
apply to all the other broad framework agreements signed after the Treaty of
Lisbon, even if such CFSP provisions are more ambitious and numerous in
several agreements than in others.66 This also indicates that the Council made
an error in the choice of legal basis when including Article 37 TEU in
Decision (EU) 2016/123 on the signing and provisional application of the
64. Opinion 2/00, Cartagena Protocol, para 23; Case C-377/12 Commission v. Council,
Framework Agreement with the Philippines, EU:C:2014:1903, para 34 and Case C-263/14,
Parliament v. Council, para 44.
65. European Commission, Amended Proposal for a Council Decision on the position to be
adopted on behalf of the European Union in the Partnership Council established by the
Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership between the European Union and the European
Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of
Armenia, of the other part, as regards the adoption of decisions on the rules of procedure of the
Partnership Council, the Partnership Committee and those of specialized subcommittees or any
other body, COM(2019)345 final, p. 3.
66. See e.g. the more ambitious provisions on CFSP and CSDP in the Association
Agreements with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, which all refer to these countries’ alignment
with the EU. For analysis, see Van der Loo, The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep
and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. A New Legal Instrument for EU Integration without
membership (Brill/Nijhoff, 2016), pp. 191–200.
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EPCA.67 The Court actually explicitly confirmed this error in its present
judgment.68
Indeed, the practice of the choice of legal bases of framework agreements
including CFSP provisions after the Treaty of Lisbon reveals that the centre of
gravity test has not been applied correctly or consistently. Several framework
agreements have a CFSP legal basis in addition to TFEU provisions such as
Article 207 (Common Commercial Policy) and/or 209 (development
cooperation) TFEU. For example, the different framework agreements with
Australia,69 New Zealand, 70 Afghanistan,71 Armenia,72 and Japan73 include
Article 37 TEU as a substantive legal basis in addition to TFEU legal bases,
but without however adding Article 31(1) TEU as a procedural legal basis.
These agreements use instead the second subparagraph of Article 218(8)
67. It is noteworthy that the Joint Proposal of the European Commission and the High
Representative already included a reference to Art. 37 TEU, in addition to Arts. 207 and 209
TFEU (see: JOIN (2015) 24 final, p. 4).
68. Judgment, para 43. A.G. Kokott noted in this context that the legal basis of Council
Decision 2016/123 on the signing and provisional application is irrelevant for the discussion
with regard to the legal basis of the contested decision in this case as “a mere practice on the part
of the Council cannot derogate from the rules of the Treaties and cannot therefore create a
precedent that is binding on the EU institutions” (Opinion, para 53).
69. The substantive legal bases of this agreement are Art. 37 TEU and Arts. 207 and 212(1)
TFEU and the procedural legal bases are Art. 218(5) and the second subparagraph of Art.
218(8) TFEU (Council Decision (EU) 2017/1546 on the signing, on behalf of the European
Union, and provisional application of the Framework Agreement between the European Union
and its Member States, of the one part, and Australia, of the other part, O.J. 2017, L 237/5).
70. The legal bases for this agreement are Art. 37 TEU and Arts. 207 and Art. 212(1) TFEU
as substantive legal bases. The procedural legal bases are Art. 218(5) and the second
subparagraph of Art. 218(8) TFEU (Council Decision 2016/2079 on the signing, on behalf of
the European Union, and provisional application of the Partnership Agreement on Relations
and Cooperation between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and New
Zealand, of the other part, O.J. 2016, L321/1).
71. The substantive legal bases of this agreement are Art. 37 TEU and Arts. 207 and 209
TFEU. The procedural legal bases are Art. 218(5) and the second subparagraph of Art. 218(8)
TFEU (Council Decision 2017/434 the signing, on behalf of the Union, and provisional
application of the Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development between the
European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan, of the other part, O.J. 2017, L 67/1).
72. The substantive legal bases of this agreement are Art. 37 TEU and Arts. 91, 100(2), 207
and 209 TFEU. The procedural legal bases are Art. 218(5) and (7) and the second subparagraph
of Art. 218(8) TFEU (Council Decision (EU) 2018/104 on the signing, on behalf of the Union,
and provisional application of the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement
between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member
States, of the one part, and the Republic of Armenia, of the other part, O.J. 2018, L23/1).
73. The substantive legal bases of this agreement are Art. 37 TEU and Art. 212(1) TFEU.
The procedural legal bases are Art. 218(5) and the second subparagraph of Art. 218(8) TFEU
(Council Decision 2018/1197 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, and provisional
application of the Strategic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its
Member States, of the one part, and Japan, of the other part, O.J. 2018, L 216/1).
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TFEU as a procedural legal basis, indirectly referring to the unanimity
requirement in the area of CFSP as “a field for which unanimity is required for
the adoption of a Union act”.74 Other framework agreements with a CFSP
legal basis, such as those signed with Cuba,75 and Canada,76 include Article
37 TEU as a substantive legal basis and Article 31(1) TEU as the procedural
legal basis, leading to the same result of unanimous decision-making in the
Council. However, other framework agreements with a similar CFSP
dimension remarkably do not have an additional CFSP legal basis, such as
recent agreements with Korea77, Iraq,78 Vietnam,79 the Philippines,80 and
Mongolia.81 It is unlikely that this is the result of a different outcome of the
centre of gravity test, considering that the qualitative and quantitative
importance of the CFSP references in these agreements is rather similar to the
74. It has to be noted that whereas the Court argues in the present case that Art. 37 is a
procedural legal basis (para 5), A.G. Kokott takes the view that Art. 37 is a substantive legal
basis and that Art. 31(1) TEU is a procedural legal basis (Opinion, para 18).
75. The legal bases of this agreement are Art. 31(1) and 37 TEU and Arts. 207, 209, 218(5)
and the second subparagraph of Art. 218(8) TFEU (Council Decision 2016/2232 on the
signing, on behalf of the Union, and provisional application of the Political Dialogue and
Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part,
and the Republic of Cuba, of the other part, O.J. 2016, L 337/1).
76. The legal bases of this agreement are Art. 31(1) and Art. 37 TEU and Arts. 212(1),
218(5) and second paragraph of Art. 218(8) TFEU (Council Decision 2016/2118 on the
signing, on behalf of the Union, and provisional application of the Strategic Partnership
Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Canada, of
the other part, O.J. 2016, L 329/43).
77. The substantive legal bases of this agreement are Arts. 207 and 212 TFEU (Council
Decision 2013/40 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, and provisional application
of the Framework Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, on the one
part, and the Republic of Korea, on the other part, O.J. 2013, L 20/1).
78. The substantive legal bases of this agreement are Arts. 79(3), 91, 100, 192(1), 194, 207
and 209 TFEU (Council Decision 2012/418 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union,
and provisional application of certain provisions of the Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the
Republic of Iraq, of the other part, O.J. 2012, L 204/18).
79. The substantive legal bases of this agreement are Arts. 79(3), 91, 100, 207 and 209
TFEU (Council Decision 2012/279/EU on the signing, on behalf of the Union, of the
Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation between the European
Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, of the
other part, O.J. 2012, L 137/1).
80. The substantive legal bases of this agreement are Arts. 79(3), 91, 100, 191(4), 207 and
209 TFEU (Council Decision 2012/272 on the signing, on behalf of the Union, of the
Framework Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between the European Union and its
Member States, of the one part, and the Republic of the Philippines, of the other part, O.J. 2012,
L 134/3).
81. The substantive legal bases of this agreement Arts. 79(3), 207 and 209 TFEU (Council
Decision 2012/273/EU on the signing, on behalf of the Union, of the Framework Agreement on
Partnership and Cooperation between the European Union and its Member States, of the one
part, and Mongolia, of the other part, O.J. 2012, L134/4).
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aforementioned agreements including a CFSP legal basis. Significantly, also
the Council decisions on the signature and provisional application of the
Association Agreements with Ukraine,82 Moldova83 and Georgia84 have a
CFSP legal basis (i.e. both Art. 37 and Art. 31(1) TEU) in combination with
Article 217 TFEU. This is remarkable as Article 217 TFEU on association is
traditionally considered as a “catch-all” provision, which does not require the
adoption of separate additional legal bases for specific provisions of such an
agreement.85 Another important association agreement signed after the Treaty
of Lisbon, i.e. the EU-Central America Association Agreement, does not
include a CFSP legal basis.86 A possible explanation seems to be that the
addition of a CFSP legal basis in the association agreements with the Eastern
neighbours was introduced to allow for a broad provisional application.87 The
latter only concerns the exercise of EU competences, and the addition of a
CFSP legal basis indicates that the Member States in the Council acted within
the framework of the EU’s CFSP competence and not as part of their national
competences in relation to foreign and security issues.88
Hence, the addition of a CFSP legal basis seemed to be a potential
instrument to avoid the conclusion of mixed agreements. A clear example is
82. Council Decision 2014/295/EU of 17 March 2014 on the signing, on behalf of the
European Union, and provisional application of the Association Agreement between the
European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the
one part, and Ukraine, of the other part, as regards the Preamble, Art. 1, and Title I, II and VII
thereof, O.J. 2014, L 161/1. It should be noted that the Ukraine Association Agreement had a
two-phase and “split” signature, with several different legal bases. For analysis see Van der Loo,
op. cit. supra note 66.
83. Council Decision 2014/492 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, and
provisional application of the Association Agreement between the European Union and the
European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and the
Republic of Moldova, of the other part, O.J. 2014, L260/1.
84. Council Decision 2014/494 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, and
provisional application of the Association Agreement between the European Union and the
European Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one part, and Georgia, of
the other part, O.J. 2014, L 261/1.
85. Van der Loo, op. cit. supra note 66. See also Van Elsuwege and Chamon, “The meaning
of ‘association’ under EU law: a study on the law and practice of EU association agreements”,
Study for the AFCO committee of the European Parliament”, Feb. 2019, available at: www.
europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2019/608861/IPOL_STU(2019)608861_EN.pdf.
86. Council Decision 2012/734 on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, of the
Agreement establishing an Association between the European Union and its Member States, on
the one hand, and Central America on the other, and the provisional application of Part IV
thereof concerning trade matters, O.J. 2012, L346/1.
87. Naert, op. cit. supra note 8, pp. 412–413.
88. In this respect, it is also noteworthy that the Council Decisions on the conclusion of the
Association Agreements remained exclusively based on Art. 217 TFEU and only the Decisions
regarding signature and provisional application contained an additional reference to a CFSP
legal basis.
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the specific case of the EU-Kosovo Stabilisation and Association Agreement
(SAA) which was negotiated, signed and concluded with a CFSP legal basis
(Art. 37 TEU) in addition to Article 217 TFEU.89 Along the same lines, the
Commission and the High Representative jointly proposed the combination of
Article 37 TEU (CFSP) and 207 (CCP) and 209 TFEU (development
cooperation) legal bases for the signature of an “EU only” Cooperation
Agreement on Partnership and Development (CAPD) with Afghanistan.90
While agreeing with the substance of the agreement, the Member States in the
Council nevertheless expressed their preference for a “mixed” agreement with
provisional application. The joint proposal was amended accordingly without
changing the legal basis of the agreement.91
As argued above, it appears that the Court’s judgment in the Kazakhstan
case will bring an end to this – sometimes inconsistent – practice of adding a
CFSP legal basis to broad framework agreements. This shift will also have
procedural consequences as the decision-making procedure in the Council for
these agreements will now be QMV – and not unanimity – with the notable
exception of association agreements, for which unanimity will still be
required pursuant to Article 218(8) TFEU. Moreover, it implies that the
Commission is supposed to act alone without involvement of the High
Representative. The latter is a consequence of Article 218(3) TFEU which
provides that the Commission or the High Representative shall submit
recommendations to the Council before the opening of negotiations. Whereas
a textual interpretation of this provision seems to suggest that only a single
actor can take the initiative, joint recommendations by the Commission and
the High Representative were frequently used in practice in order to reflect the
dual nature of the external action.92 The omission of a specific CFSP legal
basis somehow undermines this logic, implying that the initiative to submit
recommendations to the Council depends upon the centre of gravity of the
agreement.
Hence, the consequence of thisKazakhstan case is that, in the event that the
Council were to decide, after applying the centre of gravity test, that a
substantive CFSP legal basis (i.e. Art. 37 TEU) needed to be added to a
89. See Van Elsuwege, “Legal creativity in EU external relations: The Stabilization and
Association Agreement between the EU and Kosovo”, 22 EFA Rev. (2017), 393–410.
90. JOIN(2015)35 final. However, in the joint proposal for the decision on the signing and
provisional application of the EPCA, the Commission and the High Representative did include
Art. 218(8) TFEU as a procedural legal basis (JOIN(2015)24 final).
91. JOIN(2016)45 final. It is noteworthy that the provisional application of the agreement
includes some CFSP related aspects, such as the clauses on political dialogue and human rights,
but not all of them. For instance, the provisions on conflict prevention and resolution,
peace-building, small arms and light weapons, non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and counter terrorism fall outside this scope.
92. Marquardt, in Czuczai and Naert, op. cit. supra note 8, pp. 31–32.
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decision regarding the adoption of EU positions under Article 218(9),
unanimity in the Council would always be required for the adoption of this
decision and the High Representative must be involved in the negotiating
procedure. Moreover, this should be clearly reflected in the procedural legal
basis by reference to Article 31(1) TEU or to the second subparagraph of
Article 218(8) TFEU in the procedural legal basis. The possibility to include
Article 37 TEU as a substantive legal basis without adding one of these
corresponding procedural legal bases (which both lead to the same result), as
in the case of the joint proposal from the Commission and the High
Representative on the position to be adopted on behalf of the Union in the
Cooperation Council of the Kazakhstan EPCA, seems from now on to be
excluded by the Court.
6. Concluding remarks
The implications of the inter-institutional dispute between the Commission
and the Council in this case go far beyond the adoption of the rules of
procedure in the Cooperation Council with Kazakhstan. This case is to be
considered in the context of a broader controversy regarding the position of the
CFSP in the EU legal order and the choice of legal basis in relation to
international agreements including CFSP and TFEU provisions.
The Court’s judgment confirms what has been called the
“normalization”,93 “mainstreaming”94 or “assimilation”95 of the CFSP into
the Union legal order. The ECJ horizontally applies general constitutional
principles (the EU’s institutional balance) and mechanisms (the centre of
gravity test) instead of granting a special treatment to the CFSP. This is fully
consistent with the Court’s post-Lisbon case law, but nevertheless raises the
question whether this fully respects the intention of the drafters of the Treaties
to retain a distinctive position for the CFSP. Moreover, applying a centre of
gravity test with respect to horizontal agreements remains a difficult exercise.
The introduction of quantitative and qualitative criteria forms a new addition
to the existing case law, which implies that more general competences, such as
the CFSP, no longer need to be included in a separate legal basis for the
93. See e.g. Wessel, “Integration and constitutionalisation of EU foreign and security
policy” in Schütze (Ed.), Governance and Globalization: International and Constitutional
Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2018), p. 339.
94. Hillion, “Norway and the changing Common Foreign and Security Policy of the
European Union”, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (2019), p. 17.
95. Cremona, “The position of CFSP/CSDP in the EU’s constitutional architecture” in
Blockmans and Koutrakos (Eds.), Research Handbook on the EU’s Common Foreign and
Security Policy (Edward Elgar, 2018), p. 13.
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adoption of Council decisions concerning the signature or conclusion of
framework agreements.
Accordingly, the Kazakhstan case seems to put an end to the – sometimes
inconsistent – practice of adding a CFSP legal basis to broad framework
agreements which include CFSP provisions. From the perspective of the
Council, such an addition appeared necessary in light of the particular nature
of the CFSP and in order to clarify the exercise of Union rather than national
competences in relation to foreign and security issues. The Court’s judgment
clarified that this assumption is not correct. The CFSP is to be treated just like
any other policy area implying that it should not be added as a separate legal
basis unless it forms the centre of gravity of a particular decision. This
clarification also has procedural consequences as the decision-making
procedure in the Council for comprehensive framework agreements will be
QMV – and not unanimity – with the notable exception of association
agreements. Moreover, the Commission will be able to act alone, i.e. without
the High Representative, when submitting recommendations to the Council
under Article 218(3) TFEU. The same logic applies with respect to the
adoption of EU positions under Article 218 (9) TFEU insofar as the positions
cover the entire scope of the framework agreements.
Peter Van Elsuwege and Guillaume Van der Loo*
* Ghent University and University of Leuven respectively.
Case C-244/17 1353
